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JUDGE VERSUS JURY ON THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE: 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6
"EQUIVALENTS" IN THE BALANCE
ROBERT N. YOUNG*

"Certainly,"said Alice.
"And only ONE for birthday presents, you
know. There's glory for you!"
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'"Alice
said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of
course you don't-till I tell you. I meant 'there's a
nice knock-down argument for you!"
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down
argument,"Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in
rathera scornful tone, "it means just what I choose
it to mean-neithermore nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can
make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty,
"which is to be master-that'sall."'
INTRODUCTION

Although Alice and Humpty Dumpty certainly were not
talking about patent law,' Humpty Dumpty's sentiment rings true
in many of the recent watershed cases discussing fundamental
patent doctrines: "which is to be master-that's all." This very
question has been a pivotal issue in recent patent cases before the
United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court or Court).3
* J.D. Candidate, June 2000.
1. LEwIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE
FOUND THERE 190 (R.L. Green ed., 1971).

2. Id. In fact, Alice and Humpty-Dumpty were discussing Humpty
Dumpty's contention that un-birthdays were better because they occur 364
times a year as opposed to birthdays occurring once per year. Id.
3. See, e.g., William R. Zimmerman, Unifying Markman and WarnerJenkinson:A Revised Approach To The Doctrine Of Equivalents, 11 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 185, 186 (1997) (noting the importance of recent Supreme Court
decisions on the future of patent practice); Kenneth R. Adamo, Reconciling
Section 112, ff 6 Literal Equivalents With The Doctrine Of Equivalents In The
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Whether a given issue should be a court-determined question of
law or a jury-determined question of fact has also been a central
theme in the recent jurisprudence of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).4
First, in perhaps the most critical patent case in recent
memory, the Federal Circuit in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc.,5 held, and the Supreme Court affirmed,6 that the construction
of a patent claim is an issue of law solely for the province of the
court.7 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in Hilton Davis8
deferred to an earlier decision of the Federal Circuit9 that the
determination of equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents is a
question of fact. °
Wake Of Hilton Davis, 489 PRACTISING L. INST.: PAT., COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (PLI/PAT) 291,
297 (1997) (pointing out that the Supreme Court failed to decide the issue of
whether application of the doctrine of equivalents is a judge or jury question);
Robert P. Taylor & Celine T. Callahan, The Doctrine Of Equivalents After
Hilton Davis: Many Unanswered Questions, 489 PLI/PAT 7, 11 (1997) (making
note of the Supreme Court's refusal to address the issue of who determines
equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents).
4. Victoria Slind-Flor, Federal Circuit Judged Flawed, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3,
1998, at A16 (noting that the current "hot" issue before the Federal Circuit is
what issues should be left for the jury to decide). See Barry S. Wilson, Patent
Invalidity And The Seventh Amendment: Is The Jury Out? 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1787, 1787 (1997) (noting the debate in patent law surrounding the
propriety ofjuries in patent cases); Charles W. Bradley, The Changing Role Of
JuriesIn Patent Litigation, 416 PLL/PAT 113, 121 (1995) (pointing out that the
Federal Circuit has addressed the role of juries in most aspects of patent law
including, construction of patent claims, patent validity, obviousness, and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
5. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); affd 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
6. 517 U.S. 370 (1996), affg 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
7. 52 F.3d at 977.
8. 62 F.3d 1512, 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Federal Circuit would need to
revisit the decision en banc to reverse its holding. See Texas American Oil
Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(adopting precedent from the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and
requiring hearing en banc for reversal); Capital Elec. Co. v. United States, 729
F.2d 743, 746 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (adopting prior case law from the
Court of Claims as precedent and holding that reversal of this precedent may
only occur en banc). En banc review by the Federal Circuit is uncommon.
Bruce Rubenstein, Appeals Court Makes Precedent-Setting Patent Ruling,
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1998, at 26; Slind-Flor, supra note 4, at A16. En
banc reversal by the Federal Circuit would require "special justification" to
overcome the rule of stare decisis. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 164 (1989).
Finally, the Supreme Court rarely reviews the
substantive decisions of the Federal Circuit concerning patent matters. SlindFlor, supra note 4, at A16; CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 727 F.2d 1550, 1557
(Fed. Cir. 1984). These requirements pose a significant hurdle to reversal.
9. 62 F.3d at 1528.
10. 117 S. Ct. at 1043 (noting, in dicta, that the Federal Circuit's rationale
for allowing the finder of fact to decide infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is supported by prior Supreme Court precedent).
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While the Markman and Hilton Davis decisions have helped
to settle many long-standing disputes in patent law," these
holdings have had the opposite effect on related patent doctrines.
Particularly, the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court holdings in
the Markman and Hilton Davis cases have completely unsettled
the issue of whether an "equivalent" under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6, is
a question of law or one of fact.12 This problem and its proposed
resolution will be the focus of this Comment.
The Federal Circuit set the stage for the struggle over the
determination of "equivalents" under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 with its
now infamous footnote 8 in Markman:
Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974-975, 226 USPQ2d 5, 8
(Fed. Cir. 1985) also presented the issue of means-plus-function
claim limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6. As that issue is not
before us today, we express no opinion on the issue whether a
determination
of equivalents under § 112, 6 is a question of law or
13
fact.
Despite the Federal Circuit's express reservation in Markman
whether the determination of § 112, 6 "equivalents" is a question
of fact or law, the reasoning and holding in that case have
engendered confusion surrounding the determination
of
"equivalents." Further heightening the tension surrounding this
issue 5 is the Federal Circuit's holding in Hilton Davis that the

11. See Sutton et al., Don't Miss The Mark, Man!: Recent Trends And
Evidentiary Considerations In Markman Hearings, 507 PLI/PAT 867, 871
(1998) (describing Markman's effect of clarifying the rules surrounding claim
interpretation); but see Margaret Cronin Fisk, Confusion Follows '96
Landmark Patent Case, NAT'L L.J., June 15, 1998, at Al (criticizing the
Supreme Court's decision in Markman as prolonging litigation and "creating
chaos rather than certainty") (internal quotations omitted).
12. See, e.g., Sutton et al., supra note 11, at 890 (contending that the
Supreme Court's language in Hilton Davis suggests that determination of §
112, 6, "equivalents" is a question of fact); Kenneth R. Adamo, The Waiting
At The Patent Bar Is Over-The Supreme Court Decides Hilton Davis, 79 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 431, 442 (1997) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court's decision in Hilton Davis sanctioned the interpretation of equivalence
under § 112, 6 as a question of fact for the jury to decide); Kevin R. Casey,
Means Plus Function Claims After Markman: Is Claim Construction Under 35
U.S.C. § 112, Y[6 A Question Of Fact Or An Issue Of Law?, 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc y 841, 847 (1997) (advocating the position that the
Supreme Court's decision in Markman is controlling and that the
determination of "equivalents" under § 112, TI6 is a question of law).
13. Markman, 52 F.3d at 977.
14. See Casey, supra note 12, at 865 (stating that the determination of
'equivalents" as a matter of law follows logically from the Supreme Court's
Markman analysis).
15. See Adamo, supra note 12, at 434 (analogizing the Federal Circuit's
decision in Hilton Davis to the interpretation of "equivalents" under § 112,
6); Sutton et al., supra note 11, at 889 (recognizing that the Supreme Court in
Hilton Davis may view "equivalents" as a question of fact).
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related determination of equivalence under the doctrine of
equivalents is a question of fact.16 After Hilton Davis, the Federal
Circuit, en banc, revisited claim construction in the context of §
112, 6,'7 and once again reserved judgement on the issue of who
determines "equivalents.""
The definitive resolution of this issue is of paramount
importance because it directly affects the right to a jury trial and
concerns important Constitutional principles. 9 The issue of
whether a judge or a jury decides what are § 112, 6 "equivalents"
is becoming ever more important as the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) issues an increasing number of U.S.
patents with claims which facially trigger § 112,
6.20 Much of

16. 62 F.3d 1512, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing to long-standing Supreme
Court precedent which holds that infringement, either literal or under the
doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact).
17. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc).
18. Id. at 1457 n.5 (reserving, in a footnote reminiscent of the Federal
Circuit's footnote eight in Markman, the issue of whether equivalence under §
112, 6 is a question of law or fact).
19. Brian D. Coggio & Sandra A. Bresnick, The DiminishingRole Of Juries
Intellectual Property Litigation, 2/97 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 15, 15 (1997)
(noting increased usage ofjuries in patent trials and discussing the limitations
on jury and Seventh Amendment rights in determining infringement after
Markman); Kenneth R. Adamo, Reforming Jury Practice In Patent Cases:
Suggestions Towards Learning To Love Using An Eighteenth Century System
While Approaching The Twenty-First Century, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOc'y 345, 345-46 (1996) (discussing Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
in patent cases and how Markman has affected that right).
20. The following table demonstrates the trend of increasing number of
patents issued which facially trigger § 112, [6.

"Equivalents"in the Balance
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this increase may be attributed to In re Donaldson,' which
required the USPTO to follow the mandates of § 112, 6.22 The
Federal Circuit's directive limited the prior art which can be read
on a § 112, T 6 claim limitation and increased the likelihood of
Year

Total
Number of
Patents
Issued'

1998

150,958

1809

2232

63,417

64,071

1997
1996

113,641
110,671

1352
1306

1768
1677

50,995
56,511

50,481
104,713

1995

102,298

1230

1600

57,111

53,210

1994
1993
1992

102,512
98,959
98,049

1488
1603
1502

1892
2022
1904

59,931
58,422
59282

56,059
55,734
55,870

1989
1988

95,682
78 057

1318
991

1673
1273

57,716
48,159

57,321
47,248

1987

83 ,068

955

1259

53,601

52,128

1986

70,929

728

996

45,994

44,088

Number of Patents Issued with at Least One
Claim Facially Triggering 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6*
USPTO
IBM
Westlaw
Lexis
Web Site
Patent
(Dialog)
Server#

1991
1990

96,908
90,591

1445
1248

1823
1636

58,972
56,801

56,564
53,735

1985
71,740
714
983
45,230
43,649
1984
67,331
590
857
42,332
41,003
1983
56,943
494
719
35,190
33,963
1982
57,956
438
688
36,533
35,039
1981
65,864
530
876
40,523
39,171
1980
61,889
440
727
38,688
37,541
* search string was "mean" or "means."
"U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TAF REPORT ISSUE DATES AND PATENT
NUMBERS SINCE 1836 (1998).
'U.S. Patent & Trademark Web Patent Database (visited Mar. 28, 1999) <http:
//www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html>. The results presented in this graph were
obtained on March 28, 1999 by means of Boolean string searches, using the
search engine at <http://www.uspto.gov>. A copy of the string search text is
on file with the author.
# IBM Intellectual Property Network (visited Mar.28, 1999) <http://www.pate
nts.ibm.com>. The results presented in this graph were obtained on March
28, 1999 by means of Boolean string searches, using the search engine at
<httpJ/www.patents.ibm.com/boolquery>. A copy of the string search text is
on file with the author.
Note that not all of these claims will trigger § 112, $ 6. See infra notes 5157 and accompanying text for an overview of case law interpreting whether a
given patent claim triggers 35 U.S.C. 112, 6.
21. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
22. Id. at 1193. The Federal Circuit rejected the USPTO Commissioner's
argument and pointed out that nowhere does § 112, 6 exempt the USPTO
from statutory mandate in making a patentability determination. Id. The
prior practice of the Patent and Trademark Office did not apply 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 6 during examination of patent applications. Id. at 1194. Instead, the
Patent and Trademark Office gave means-plus-function elements their
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:833

patent allowance on § 112, 6 claims. 23 This increase is reflected
in the rising number of patent cases litigated, both before the
District Courts and the Federal Circuit, involving the
interpretation of "equivalents."4 This trend is likely to continue as
§ 112, %6 claim limitations are becoming increasingly common in
patents directed to the fields of electronic technology and
applications involving computers and computer software.25
23. See William F. Lee & Eugene M. Paige, Means Plus And Step Plus
Function Claims: Do We Only Know Them When We See Them?, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SoclY 251, 255 (1998) (pinpointing In re Donaldson as the
start of a timeline showing increased usage of § 112, 6 claim limitations).
24. Lee & Paige, supra note 23, at 251.
Number of Cases Reported Involving the Litigation of Claims Interpreted
Under § 112, 6 * Since the Inception of the Federal Circuit
Federal
Federal
District
District
Year
Courts
Courts
Circuit
Circuit
(Lexis)
(Westlaw)
(Lexis)
(Westlaw)
1998
41
38
24
25
1997
37
35
19
20
1996
22
21
10
10
1995
15
15
9
8
1994
23
24
10
11
1993
16
17
7
7
1992
9
12
7
6
1991
7
7
6
7
1990
6
7
2
2
1989
8
6
3
5
1988
8
6
8
10
1987
3
3
8
7
1986
6
5
4
4
1985
2
3
5
5
1984
2
1
1
1
1983
1
1
2
2
* search string was "means-plus-function" or "means plus function."
25. Casey, supra note 12, at 842; see, e.g., Gregory J. Maier & Bradley D.
Lytle, The Strategic Use Of Means-Plus-Function Claims, 80 J. PAT.
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 241, 244 (1998) (discussing using "means-plusfunction" claims in an overall claim drafting strategy for advanced
technology); Ronald S. Laurie, Materials on Question 133: Patenting of
Computer Software, 489 PLI/PAT 253, 278 (1997) (discussing utilization of
"means-plus-function" claims in software patents); R. Lewis Gable & Morey B.
Wildes, How to Prepare a Patent Protecting A Computer Implemented
Invention: A BalancingAct Created By 35 U.S. C § 112, 1' 6, 489 PLI/PAT 183,
211 (1997) (emphasizing use of "means-plus-function" claims in patents
claiming software to achieve expanded coverage); Garner et al., Advanced
Claim Drafting and Amendment Writing Workshop For Electronics and
Computer-Related Subject Matter, 501 PLI/PAT 229, 308-09 (1997) (discussing
the importance of means-plus-function coverage for electronics claims); Robert
C. Faber, The Winning Mechanical Claim, 464 PLI/PAT 19, 58 (1996)
(discussing "means-plus-function" claims as the most efficient way to claim
certain limitations); Lawrence Kass, Computer Software Patentabilityand the
Role of Means-Plus-FunctionFormat In Computer Software Claims, 15 PACE
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The determination of § 112,
6 "equivalents" is related to
both the pure legal issue of claim construction and the factual
determination of equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents
and thus falls somewhere between their divergent ideologies.
Accordingly, this Comment will examine where the determination
of "equivalents" falls within the framework set forth in the
Markman and Hilton Davis decisions.
First, this Comment examines the analysis and history
surrounding litigation of § 112,
6 claim limitations. Next, this
Comment follows the Supreme Court's analysis in Markman,
utilizing the familiar Seventh Amendment analysis, case
precedent, relative interpretive skills of judges versus juries, and
statutory policies to examine where determination of § 112,
6
"equivalents" falls on the legal issue/factual question spectrum.
After weighing all of these factors, this Comment proposes that
the determination of "equivalents" be resolved as a question of
fact. Taking further note of a significant policy supporting the
consistent application of patent laws, this Comment goes on to
propose that the Federal Circuit set a clear precedent by endorsing
the use of special verdicts or interrogatories to facilitate a jury's
factual findings surrounding "equivalents."
I.

BACKGROUND OF PATENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF
FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN PATENTS

A. Foundationand Background of Patent Law
Among Congress' enumerated powers under the Constitution
is the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."26
Congress exercised this power to create patent legislation 7 which
fosters innovation by granting inventors the "right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention"8 for a period of 20 years from the date of the patent
filing.29
L. REv. 787, 791 (1995) (discussing Federal Circuit interpretation of "meansplus-function" limitations in computer software patents).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This section of the Constitution is
commonly referred to as the "Patents Clause," but it also sanctions the
creation of copyright protection.
27. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1998).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1998). Note that the patent owner is given the
right to exclude others from making the claimed invention, not the right to
make the claimed invention himself. Id.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1995), which reads:
(2) Term.-Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant
shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues
and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
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In exchange for this limited period of exclusivity, Congress
has required that an inventor describe the invention "in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art ...to make and use" the invention . ° A patent must also
include one or more claims 3' which "particularly points out and
distinctly claims the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention."' The claims of a patent serve three independent
purposes." First, patent claims define an invention for purposes of
determining whether the invention meets the statutory
requirements for patentability. 4 Second, patent claims give notice
to the public of the rights afforded to the inventor by defining the
boundaries of the invention." Third, patent claims define the
scope of the invention in order to make possible the determination
of whether a given accused infringer has in fact infringed a patent
owner's rights."6
Patent claims consist of limitations 37 which define distinct
parts of an invention.38 Typically, claim limitations describe the
material or structure which perform an intended function.
However, 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 sanctions the drafting of claim
limitations using purely functional language. 9 Section 112,
6

patent was filed in the United States or, if the application contains a
specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications under
section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title, from the date on which the
earliest such application was filed.
Id.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112, %1 (1998).
31. "Inpatent law, a claim is an assertion of what the invention purports to
accomplish, and claims of a patent define the invention and extent of the
grant; any feature of an invention not stated in the claim is beyond the scope
of the patent protection." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (6th ed. 1990).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1I 2 (1998).
33. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (discussing the notice purpose of patent claims); Rick D. Nydegger,
Traversing The Section 112, f[Six Field Of Land Mines: Does In Re Donaldson
Adequately Defuse The Problems? (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 947, 948 (1994) (discussing the patentability and infringement
determination aspects of patent claims).
34. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS (Matthew
Bender ed., 1998) § 8.01 and footnotes contained thereizi.
35. "It seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the
patentee and to the public, than that the former should understand, and
correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a
patent." Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1908).
36. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
37. Claim limitations are also referred to as elements. Panduit Corp. v.
Dennison Mfg Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1087 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
38. CHISUM, supra note 34, §8.06 (noting that patent claims are made up of
three sections: the preamble, the transition and the body, which contain the
limitations).
39. Maier & Lytle, supra note 25, at 247. The classical illustration of a
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states:
[an element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the recital
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim
shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof."

Claim limitations drafted under this section are commonly
referred to as "means-plus-function" limitations.41
Lawsuits alleging violation of an inventor's patent rights
charge that the patent has been infringed." An infringement
determination is a two-step process. 3 First, the court interprets
the language, or scope, of a claim as a matter of law." Second, the
construed claims are applied to the accused infringing device by
the finder of fact to determine whether infringement, either literal
or under the doctrine of equivalents, exists.4" Literal infringement
occurs when the accused device contains every limitation of a
patent claim.46 Conversely, the doctrine of equivalents expands a
patent owner's rights beyond the literal claim language by
forbidding others from avoiding infringement through making only
insubstantial changes to a patented invention. 47 Although labeled
means-plus-function element uses the phrase "means for fastening" in the
claim language. Baltimore Therapeutic Equip. Co. v. Loredan Biomedical Inc.,
30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1677 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Rich, J., concurring). The
specification discloses the use of a nail as the "means for fastening." Id.
Because 35 U.S.C. § 112, 9 6 limits patent coverage to what is disclosed in the
specification and its "equivalents," the inventor can rest assured that a wouldbe infringer could not change the nail to a screw and thereby avoid the scope
of the patent claim. Id. However, the accused infringer could likely replace
the nail with some adhesive, as they are not structurally equivalent. Id.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6 (1998).
41. Claims containing "means-plus-function" limitations are also referred to
as "means-plus-function" claims when referring to the claims as a whole.
42. H. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 33 (2d ed. 1995).
43. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90
F.3d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
44. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
45. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992); David R.
Todd, How Modern Treatment Of 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) Has Caused Confusion:
Hilton Davis v. Warner Jenkinson And The Right To A Jury On The Issue Of
Patent Infringement Under The "Equitable" Doctrine Of Equivalents, 1996
BYU L. REV. 141, 141 (1996).
46. CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc., v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1161 (Fed.Cir.
1997); Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 1440, 1443 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1583,
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 906 (1995); Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach.
Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547, (Fed. Cir. 1994); Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 821;
Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
47. Laurence H. Pretty & Janene Bassett, Reconciling Section 112, Y[6 With
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"literal,"8 infringement of a claim invoking § 112, $ 6 requires the
trier of fact to look beyond the four corners of the patent in order
to determine infringement.49
In order for a claim limitation to trigger interpretation under
§ 112, 6, the court must first determine, as a matter of law,5" that
the limitation meets the § 112,
6 statutory requirements. 5' In
order to invoke § 112, 6 protection, a claim limitation must recite
primarily functional, as opposed to structural, language."'
Although there is no "magical" language required to bring a
limitation within the province of § 112, $ 6, the terms" . . . means"
or "means for. . ." are typically employed.53 Despite this mantra,
use of the term "means" will not trigger the § 112, 6 analysis if
sufficient structural language is set forth in the limitation. 4
Conversely, § 112,
6 may be triggered without the recitation of
"means" in a patent limitation." It is not clear exactly where the
line invoking interpretation under § 112,
6 is drawn, as claim
limitations containing both functional and structural language
have triggered § 112, 6.'6
The Doctrine Of Equivalents In The Wake Of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co., 489 PLI/PAT 359, 363 (1997) (discussing the Supreme
Court's reaffirmance of the doctrine of equivalents and the two most used test
for infringement under the doctrine).
48. See Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Products Int'l, Ltd., 157 F.3d 1311,
1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the infringement of means-plus-function
claims under the heading of Literal Infringement); MAS-Hamilton Group v.
LaGard Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing elements necessary
to find literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim).
49. See Casey, supra note 12, at 853 (conceding that in an infringement
analysis under § 112, 6 the court must look beyond the patent to the accused
infringing device itself).
50. Personalized Media Comm., LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696,
702 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that invocation of § 112, 1i 6 is part of claim
construction reviewed under the de novo standard).
51. Unidynamics, 157 F.3d at 1318; see Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102
F.3d 524, 530-31 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (first examining whether a claim limitation
invoked § 112, 6 before continuing on to an infringement analysis).
52. Cole, 102 F.3d at 530-31.
53. See Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (noting that patent drafters typically use the expression "means for"
and noting that the question of whether a limitation falls under § 112, 6 is
usually not confusing).
54. Cole, 102 F.3d at 531. The claim limitation in question was "perforation
means ... for tearing." Id. The court found that the recitation of "perforation"
was sufficiently structural to preclude interpretation of the limitation under §
112, 6. Id.
55. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that the recitation of "so that" was sufficient to invoke § 112, 6).
56. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(noting that structural language may help to further define the function but
not the structure); but cf Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196,
1201 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that proper means-plus-function claims do not
recite any structural components).
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Claim construction of a means-plus-function claim limitation
is further broken down into a determination of the claimed
function57 and identification of the corresponding structure in the
specification which performs the function. 8 The court determines
both the claimed function and the corresponding structures as a
matter of law.59
Finally, the identified structure is compared against the
accused infringing device to determine whether the accused device
is an "equivalent" and thus infringes.5 In order for the accused
device to be "equivalent," it must perform the identical function as
the means-plus-function claim limitation with a structure
equivalent to that limitation.6' It is this final determination with
which the Federal Circuit was concerned about in footnote 8 of
Markman.62
Limitation in
B. HistoricalDevelopment of "Mean-Plus-Function"
Patent Claims
The interpretation of functional elements in patent claims got
off to a shaky start in the seminal case of O'Reilly v. Morse.63 The
Court in O'Reilly held that clauses containing only single
limitations employing functional language were invalid as
claiming functions or effects which impermissibly broadened the
scope of the patent coverage beyond what the inventor actually
invented." However, until 1946, subsequent Supreme Court cases
57. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
58. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(reciting, as the test for "corresponding structure," that the specification and
the functional language must be clearly linked); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d
1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
59. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d
1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
60. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (en banc).
61. Kegel Comp., Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1428 (Fed. Cir.
1997)
62. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
controversy raised by footnote eight in Markman.
63. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). The issue decided in O'Reilly concerned
functional language in a patent claim containing only a single means
limitation. This is still the current patent law today. Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6, which states that "[aln element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step..." (emphasis added); In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712,
714 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
64. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112. Claim eight of the patent in question
read:
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or
parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims;
the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the
electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however
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held that functional limitations in combination claims were valid."
In 1946, the Supreme Court in Halliburton Oil Well
6
Cementing Co. v. Walker"
reversed the line of cases resulting from
O'Reilly and rejected patent claims that used functional language
to describe the invention.67
Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision in
Halliburton by enacting the third paragraph of Section 112, Title
35 of the Patent Act of 1952.8 The new statutory provision
restored the use of broad, functional language in combination
69
claims as was practiced prior to Halliburton.
This enactment is

developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or
letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power of which
I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
Id. The court held that the inventor's intention in attempting to claim every
scientific advance utilizing galvanic current to produce letters, numbers or
intelligible characters at a distance invalid. Id. The Supreme Court found the
claims invalid because the functional language described what the limitations
would do and not their physical arrangement or characteristics. Id. Thus, the
inventor could not claim the underlying scientific principles by which the
invention worked, but rather had to claim the machinery which utilized the
principles to achieve a useful effect. Id. The Court reasoned that utilizing
functional language defied the notice purpose of patent claims by introducing
impermissible ambiguity and expansion of the scope of patent claims. Id.
65. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 547 (1870)
(setting the foundation for § 112, $ 6 by requiring the functional language
used in claim to be read on the structure set forth in the specification); Boyden
Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 556-60 (1898) (setting the
foundation for § 112, 6 by requiring the functional language used in claim to
be read on the structure set forth in the specification); accord In re Fuetterer,
319 F.2d 259, 264 n.11, (C.C.P.A. 1963).
"We feel, however, that a
considerable body of case law, if not the preponderance thereof, before the
Halliburton case interpreted broad statements of structure, e.g., 'means,' plus
a statement of function in the manner now sanctioned by the statute." In re
Fuetterer,319 F.2d at 264 n.11.
66. 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
67. Id. at 8 (holding that the claims violated statute by using "conveniently
functional language at the exact point of novelty").
68. In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that it is
clear that Congress enacted § 112, 6 to overturn the Halliburton decision);
Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(finding § 112,
6 was passed to restore the use of functional language in
patent claims); Application of Lundsberg, 244 F.2d 543, 547 (C.C.P.A. 1957)
(overruledon other grounds by In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 119394 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (stating correctness of appellant's argument that § 112, II
6 was passed to modify or overturn decisions like Halliburton).
69. The Hon. Joseph R. Bryson stated before the Philadelphia Patent Law
Association in January 24, 1952 that "[tihis provision in reality will give
statutory sanction to combination claiming as it was understood prior to the
Halliburton decision. All the elements of a combination now will be able to be
claimed in terms of what they do as well as in the terms of what they are."
Fuetterer, 319 F.2d at 264, n.11; accord Valmont, 983 F.2d 1039 at 1042
(noting that § 112, $ 6 rendered Halliburton obsolete).

19991

"Equivalents"in the Balance

embodied in current 35 U.S.C. § 112,

845

6.0

II. APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S MARKMAN LAW/FACT
ANALYSIS TO §

112,

6 "EQUIVALENTS"

The Supreme Court has provided an outline of the analysis
used in determining whether an issue is a legal issue or a factual
question. 71
First, the Court looks to the familiar Seventh
Amendment analysis to determine whether a common law right to
a jury trial existed over the issue in 1791.72 If the Seventh
Amendment analysis is inconclusive, the Court further utilizes
three factors in deciding if an issue is a legal or factual question:
legal precedent, the interpretive skills of judges and juries, and
statutory policies. 73 Accordingly, this Comment will utilize the
analysis set forth by the Supreme Court to interpret the law/fact
dichotomy surrounding § 112, 6 "equivalents."
A. Seventh Amendment Analysis
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Markman and the
fact that valid patent claims containing functional language first
occurred in the nineteenth century, 74 a Seventh Amendment
7
analysis will not adequately resolve this issue."
Accordingly, a

70. Cf. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. 112, 91 3 (1952).
71. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 375, 387-88
(1996).
72. Id. at 376. Under this "historical test," the Court first looks to whether
a cause of action, or a historically analogous cause of action, was tried at law
when our Constitution was adopted in 1791. Id. If the cause of action was
tried at law, the Court next looks to whether the ultimate decision of the issue
is required to be tried by jury to preserve the common-law right to a jury trial.
Id. Under this second question, where historical precedent does not provide a
clear reservation of the right to a jury trial, the analysis is less than foolproof.
Id. at 378.
73. Id. at 384.
74. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), the first case discussing
functional language, was decided in 1853. See supra note 64.
75. See, e.g., Markman, 517 U.S. at 376-88. Because the Supreme Court's
Seventh Amendment analysis in Markman is analogous to the determination
of "equivalents" under § 112, 916, the Court's analysis is examined below.
First, the Supreme Court looked to patent infringement suits as they existed
in the eighteenth century and concluded that the issue of determining
infringement of a patent was clearly the role of the jury. Id. at 377. The
Court then examined whether the specific issue of claim construction was so
essential to the determination of infringement that it should be preserved as a
jury issue. Id. There, the Court found that no clear historical precedent
relegated claim construction to either the court or the jury because early
patent practice did not require the use of patent claims. Id. at 378. The Court
then looked for an "appropriate analogy" under English common law for
guidance. Id. at 379. The Supreme Court found the issue of interpretation of
the patent specification most like the current practice of claim construction.
Id. However, the Court found only a "smattering" of cases construing patent
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Seventh Amendment analysis will not be undertaken.
B. JudicialPrecedent
1. Judicial PrecedentPre-Markman
Prior to the Supreme Court's Markman decision, judicial
precedent fostered under the Federal Circuit consistently held that
the determination of an "equivalent" under § 112,
6 was a
question of fact. 6 However, the value of this earlier precedent is
unclear as the seminal Federal Circuit case, D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere &
Co. ,77merely stated this proposition without citing any authority

or offering supporting reasoning. 8 However, other statements of
the court in D.M.I. are in accord with current case law. D.M.I.
stated not only the pure Markman proposition, that claim
construction is a matter of law, 9 it also made clear that
"equivalents" under § 112,
6 should not be confused with the
doctrine of equivalents."
The next opinion addressing the factual determination of
"equivalents," Palumbo v. Don-Joy, Co.," offered two lines of
reasoning to support the holding that the determination of
"equivalents" is a question of fact.82 First, the court looked to the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products
Co. , which set forth the widely-used "Function-Way-Result" test
for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and held that
application of this test is a question of fact.8 ' However, the Federal
Circuit has criticized reliance on the doctrine of equivalents when

specifications, which cumulatively led the Court to conclude that there was no
established interpretation of specifications by juries. Id. at 383.
The
appellant, not to be deterred, produced case law from the mid-nineteenth
century where interpretation of "words of art" was left to the jury. Id.
Ultimately, the Court found this precedent unpersuasive and held that the

"historical test" was not determinative of the issue. Id.
76. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Durango

Assoc., Inc. v.
Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Hartness Int'l, Inc. v.
Simplimatic Eng'g Co., 819 F.2d 1100, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1987); King Instrument
Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Palumbo v. Don-Joy
Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985); D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d
1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
77. 755 F.2d at 1570.
78. Id. at 1574.
79. Id. at 1573; cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
80. 755 F.2d at 1575.
81. 762 F.2d 969.
82. Id. at 975.
83. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
84. Id. at 609 (noting that, like any factual question, the final outcome
should depend upon a balancing of credibility, effectiveness, and the strength
of the evidence).
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analyzing "equivalents" under § 112, 6.85 Despite this criticism,
Palumbo is in line with current case law in holding that a
distinction exists between "equivalents" under § 112,
6 and the
doctrine of equivalents.86 Alternatively, the court reasoned that
ambiguity surrounding the prosecution history and interpretation
of a patent claim gave rise to a factual question.87 This last line of
reasoning has been expressly overruled in the Markman" cases
and in Cybor v. FAS Technologies.89 Thus, it is not clear how much
weight pre-Markman precedent carries in determining the issue."
2. The Doctrine of Equivalents and Hilton Davis' Impact on
§ 112, 5Y6 "Equivalents"
The Federal Circuit has almost dogmatically denounced the
intermingling of the concept of "equivalents" under § 112, 6 with
the doctrine of equivalents.9 In supporting this distinction, the
Federal Circuit has noted that the two concepts have differing
origins, purposes, and applications." However, the Federal Circuit
has never fully addressed whether there is ultimately any tangible
difference between equivalence under § 112, 6, and the doctrine
of equivalents.9 3 Several commentators, including one Federal
Circuit judge, have espoused the theory that equivalence under
85. See infra note 91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the error in
confusing the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, 6.
86. 762 F.2d at 975.
87. Id. at 976 (accepting the inventor's apparently self-serving argument as
creating a disputed question of fact which defeats a motion for summary
judgment).
88. 52 F.3d at 977.
89. 138 F.3d at 1454.
90. Id.
91. See generally Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d
821, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the parties' confusion between the two
concepts); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (overruled on other grounds by A. C. Aukerman Co. v. R. L. Chiades
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038-39 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (noting possible error of
the district court in applying the doctrine of equivalents in the more limited
literal infringement analysis under § 112, 916); Pennwalt Corp. v. DurandWayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (stating that § 112,
T16 has no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents); D.M.I., Inc. v.
Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "equivalent"
under § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents should not be confused).
92. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1109, 1022 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., additional views) (contending that lay people may be
confused between § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents, but that patent
practitioners understand the distinction); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg.
Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
93. Dawn Equip. Co., 140 F.3d at 1021 (Plager, J., additional views) (noting
the two formulations of equivalents have not been tackled side by side); Mark
D. Janis, Unmasking Structural Equivalency: The Intersection Of § 112, f 6
Equivalents And The Doctrine Of Equivalents, 4 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH 205,
206-07 (1994).
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the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, 6 converge in application.'
Accordingly, a close examination of both concepts is required in
order to determine the relevance of the doctrine of equivalents to §
112, 6 "equivalents."
Historically, the concept embodied in the doctrine of
equivalents was first introduced in the Supreme Court's Evans v.
Eaton9 decision."6 Throughout the evolution of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents, the ultimate test has always revolved
around the concept of substantiality.97 Ultimately, these decisions
led to the current "Function-Way-Result" test for infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.98 The purpose of expanding
patent coverage under the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent an
infringer from perpetrating fraud on the patent.99
Conversely, § 112,
6 was enacted to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision Halliburton and restore the use of functional
language in patent claims. 00 However, using the enactment of §
112, 6 as a starting point overlooks the earlier development of
functional language in patent claims.10' A more thorough analysis

94. Dawn Equip. Co., 140 F.3d at 1021 (Plager, J., additional views); Janis,
supra note 93, at 207; Pretty & Bassett, supra note 47, at 363 (suggesting the
Supreme Court's Hilton Davis decision resulted in conformity between the
doctrine of equivalents and § 112,
6); Adamo, supra note 12, at 433
(speculating whether the two concepts will collapse into a single analysis after
Hilton Davis); Taylor & Callahan, supra note 3, at 29 (discussing the Supreme
Court's concern for the issue in Hilton Davis).
95. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
96. Id. at 361. "[I]f the two machines be substantially the same, and
operate in the same manner, to produce the same result, though they may
differ in form, proportions, and utility, they are the same in principle[.]" Id.
The doctrine of equivalents was not referred to by name until 35 years later.
McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 405, 407 (1857).
97. See Evans, 20 U.S. at 364 (stating that the test examines whether a
possible equivalent is "substantially the same ... in principle"); Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 332 (1853) (stating that the test examines whether a
possible equivalent is "substantially the same in principle and mode of
operation"); Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 572-73 (1863) ("performs... or
produces.., in... substantially the same way").
98. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (setting out infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents if the accused infringing device "performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result").
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (interpreting § 112, 6 as
overturning Halliburton).
101. Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, III, The Rosetta Stone
For The Doctrines Of Means-Plus-Function Patent Claims, 23 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 243 (1997) (noting that only looking to the
enactment of § 112, 1 6 to distinguish "equivalents" from the doctrine of
equivalents is overly simplistic in that it only addresses the effect, and not the
cause, of the statute).
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reveals that the two concepts share a similar historical origin." 2
This common origin is reflected in the language of Winans v.
Denmead."'O In Winans, the Supreme Court, in applying the
predecessor to the doctrine of equivalents, refused to limit a patent
claim's interpretation to the literal claim language and instead
looked to the patent specification to determine infringement." '
This interpretation of the patent claims in light of the specification
mirrors the language, and infringement analysis, of § 112,
6.15
Comments surrounding the enactment of § 112,
6 further
suggest that the statute was passed to specifically enact the
doctrine of equivalents in a limited role surrounding functional
language.0 6 Thus, § 112,
6 "equivalents" and the doctrine of
equivalents share similar, although not identical, historical and
purposeful grounds.0 7
Perhaps a stronger ground for distinguishing the doctrine of
equivalents from § 112,
6 "equivalents" lies in their respective
applications."l8
Clear differences in the analyses of the two
concepts do exist. First, equivalence under both the doctrine of
equivalents and § 112,
6 are applied at the time of
infringement."' However, application of the doctrine is limited

102. Janis, supra note 93, at 212; Pretty & Bassett, supranote 47, at 370.
103. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
104. Id. at 340, 342.
105. Cf. supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text (setting out the road map
for infringement of a means-plus-function limitation).
106. "This provision also gives recognition to the existence of the doctrine of
equivalents." Addressing the Philadelphia Patent Law Association (Jan. 24,
1952), in 98 CONG. REC. A415, A416 (1952) (comments of Congressman Joseph
R. Bryson, Chairman of the House Committee that oversaw the drafting of the
Patent Act of 1952); "This section ... introduces into the statute for the first
time the controversial doctrine of equivalents." Patent Law Codification and
Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm.
On the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1951) (statement of the Chief T.
Hayward Brown of the Patent Litigation Unit, Claims Division, Department
of Justice); "The language of 35 U.S.C. § 112 [1 61 and its application.., is
clearly a restrictive application of the doctrine of equivalents. It is the ...
'doctrine of equivalents' codified for the first time in the patent statute."
Ronald D. Hantman, Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'y 511, 546 (1988).
107. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
and origin of§ 112, I 6).
108. See David O'Dell, The Emerging Definition of Equivalency, 22 J.
CONTEMP. L. 335, 357-60 (1996) (discussing differences in the application of
the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, 6).
109. See Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents For The Twenty-First Century:
Maximize Patent Strength And Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel In A PostMarkman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 499, 506
(1997) (noting that under the current rule technology not existing at the time
the patent was granted "may still infringe it under the doctrine of
equivalents"); Snellman v. Ricoh Co., Ltd., 862 F.2d 283, 288 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(applying § 112, 6 during the infringement analysis).
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solely to the infringement analysis,"' while § 112,
6 is also
applied during the patentability determination."'
Next, under the doctrine of equivalents the accused infringing
device need only perform a function equivalent to that found in the
patent." 2 Conversely, a § 112, 6 "equivalent" must perform the
identical function identified in the patent specification."' Thus, if
identity of function is not found in the accused infringing device,
the device will fail the more limited § 112,
6 test but may
infringe under the doctrine of equivalents."' In reality, however,
the Federal Circuit has been consistently unwilling to find
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents when literal
infringement of a means-plus-function claim is absent."'
Although there are distinctions between § 112,
6 and the
doctrine of equivalents, these differences support the observation
that application of § 112, 6, is simply a more restricted version of
the doctrine of equivalents."' Indeed, the Supreme Court adopted
this position in Hilton Davis."7
Semantic differences between the doctrine of equivalents and
§ 112, 6 also suggest a non-conformity between the two concepts.
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is termed

110. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, 66 F.3d 1211, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1115 (1997); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
111. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (applying § 112, 6 in
anticipation of patent claims); In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1994 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (mandating the USPTO apply § 112, 6 during patent prosecution).
112. Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 688, 692
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Comark Comms., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1188
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 102 F.3d 1214,
1222 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d
1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
822 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
113. Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Products Int'l, Ltd., 157 F.3d 1311,
1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Desper Prods., Inc. v. QSound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,
1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997); King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 945-46
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
114. Pretty & Bassett, supra note 47, at 363 (noting, however, that this
distinction may be illusory because of the difficulty of determining where
identical ends and substantial begins).
115. See, e.g., Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1017
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing finding of infringement of means-plus-function
claim for lack of substantial evidence); Desper Products, 157 F.3d at 1340
(affirming non-infringement under § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents).
116. Janis, supra note 93, at 214-15 (stating the lack of support for
distinguishing the doctrine of equivalents from § 112, 6 on the basis of their
respective scope).
117. Werner-Jenkins Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28
(1997). "[§ 112,
6] is an application of the doctrine of equivalents in a
restrictive role ....

"

Id.

1999]

"Equivalents"in the Balance

"equitable" " 8 while infringement of a means-plus-function claim is
"literal.""1. However, the Supreme Court has found no purposeful
difference between infringement under the doctrine and literal
infringement. 2 '
Moreover, there are no underlying equitable
considerations in infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 2'
Thus, the "equitable" versus "literal" distinction is without merit.
Others argue that because the doctrine of equivalents looks to
the claim for the relevant structure, while § 112, 1 6 looks to the
specification, these are sufficient grounds to distinguish the two."'
However, this argument fails to acknowledge that the claims are
part of the specification."3
This argument is also internally
inconsistent because if the doctrine of equivalents was limited to
identifying the structure in the claims, then the doctrine could
never be applied to means-plus-function claims. 2 4 Although the
Federal Circuit rarely, if ever, finds infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents where a means-plus-function claim is not
literally infringed, they consistently apply the doctrine of
equivalents infringement analysis."'
The Federal Circuit, in rhetorical fashion, often distinguishes
the two concepts
by referring to the doctrine of equivalents as
"expanding" 26 and § 112, 6 as "restricting"127 the scope of patent
coverage. However, this observation is consistent with the idea
118. See Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036,
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that "confinement of the doctrine of equivalents to its
proper equitable role"); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534,
1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (calling it an "equitable doctrine"); Loctite Corp. v.
Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that the doctrine is
"judicially devised to do equity").
119. Dawn Equip., 140 F.3d at 1020; Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United
States Intl Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
120. Hilton Davis, 520 U.S. at 35. "[Tlhere is no basis for treating an
infringing equivalent any differently than a device that infringes the express
terms of the patent. Application of the doctrine of equivalents, therefore, is
akin to determining literal infringement...." Id.
121. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521 (noting that infringement under the
doctrine is a question of fact and no "clean hands" limitation is placed on the
doctrine).
122. Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
123. 35 U.S.C. 112, 1 2. "The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims.... ." Id.
124. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting that means-plusfunction claims refer back to the specification for the relevant structure).
125. See, e.g., Dawn Equip., 140 F.3d at 1015-18 (applying the doctrine of
equivalents); Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (examining infringement of a means-plus-function claim under the
doctrine of equivalents).
126. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Intervet America, Inc. v. Kee-Vet Lab., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
127. PersonalizedMedia, 161 F.3d 696, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
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that § 112, 6 is simply a more limited application of the doctrine
of equivalents. 28
Although there are differences between the doctrine of
equivalents and § 112,
6, these differences are not so
consequential as to preclude looking to the doctrine of equivalents
for guidance in interpreting § 112, 6 "equivalents." 9
Reliance only on these specious dissimilarities also overlooks
the corresponding aspects of the two concepts. Although the
doctrine of equivalents and § 112,
6 share similar historical
foundations, the two ideas have diverged over time.'
However,
the Federal Circuit, in Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo,'' took
the first step of bringing the two concepts back into congruence by
introducing prosecution history estoppel,11 2 a long-standing
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents,"2 into the interpretation
of means-plus-function claims.'
Next, the Supreme Court in
Hilton Davis brought the doctrine of equivalents and § 112,
6
further into conformity by requiring that the doctrine be applied
on an element-by-element basis,"' a familiar practice in
interpreting § 112, 6.1 Thus, the doctrine of equivalents and §
112, 6 are gradually blending into harmony with one another." 7
Strengthening the argument for reliance on the doctrine of
equivalents in interpreting § 112,
6 "equivalents" involves the
underlying test used to determine infringement for both concepts.
The preferred test for the doctrine of equivalents is the Graver
Tank "Function-Way-Result" test.'
Although using the
"Function-Way-Result" test in interpreting § 112, 6 "equivalents"
has been held to be error,' a modified form of the test has been
128. See supra notes 106 and 117 and accompanying text (discussing
'means-plus-function" equivalency as a limited application of the doctrine of
equivalents).
129. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing whether there
is any meaningful difference between 112, %6 "equivalents" and infringement

under the doctrine of equivalents).
130. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text (chronicling the
differences between the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, 6).
131. 102 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
132. Prosecution history estoppel prevents a patent owner from claiming
subject matter that was forfeited in the prosecution phase of the patent.
Alpex, 102 F.3d at 1220.
133. Adamo, supra note 12, at 434-35.
134. Alpex, 102 F.3d at 1220.
135. Werner-Jenkins Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 18
(1997).

136. Pretty & Bassett, supra note 47, at 373-74.
137. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing the
convergence of equivalency under § 112, 916 and the doctrine of equivalents).
138. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
139. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(reversing and remanding due to confusion between doctrine of equivalents
and § 112, 6 "equivalents").
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Moreover, the Supreme Court retained the

notion of "insubstantial change" under the doctrine by expressly
rejecting the "Function-Way-Result" test as the only applicable
test under the doctrine of equivalents.'
Accordingly, the tests
used to determine infringement under both the doctrine of
equivalents and § 112, 6 remain centered around the concept of
"insubstantial change."
This comparison is not exhaustive and does not answer the
underlying question whether equivalence under the doctrine of
equivalents and § 112,
6 are ultimately the same concept. It
does, however, provide sufficiently persuasive grounds for reliance
on the doctrine of equivalents in interpreting § 112,
6
"equivalents." Therefore, the Federal Circuit's holding that
infringement under the doctrine is a question of fact supports the
determination of "equivalents" as a factual question. 42
3. Markman and Cybor v. FAS Technologies
Despite the Supreme Court's unequivocal holding in
Markman, the Court's characterization of claim construction as a
"mongrel practice"'" and "somewhere between a pristine legal
standard and a simple historical fact"'45 left open the question of
whether there were underlying factual questions in claim
construction.
This discrepancy has led some panels of the
Federal Circuit to defer to a district court's ostensibly factual
conclusions underlying claim construction. 7
Expressly reversing these decisions, the Federal Circuit in
Cybor v. FAS Technologies4 1 unanimously laid to rest the notion
that there are any underlying factual findings in claim
construction. 14 Cybor reiterated that claim construction is a
140. Texas Instruments v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
141. Hilton Davis, 520 U.S. at 18 (refusing to limit the doctrine of
equivalents to any linguistic framework).
142. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (discussing the standard
for determining infringement under § 112, 9 6).
143. See Sutton et al.,
supra note 11, at 890; Adamo, supra note 12 at 442.
144. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).
145. Id. at 388.
146. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed.

Cir. 1998) (en banc) (explaining that these comments were only "prefatory" to
the Supreme Court's ultimate determination of the issue).
147. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547,
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wiener v. NEC Elecs. Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

(overruled on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).

148. 138 F.3d 1448.
149. Id. at 1455 (noting in footnote 4 that the Supreme Court would surely

have discussed if any underlying factual determinations were to be made in
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purely legal issue and further held that no deference should be
granted to a district court's apparently factual determinations in
construing a disputed claim."O
Despite this unanimity of opinion, five justices wrote or joined
separate concurring opinions stating that the trial judge's
conclusions concerning factual matters should be accorded some
weight."" Thus, even the purely legal status of claim construction,
while not currently in doubt, may have an uncertain future. 5'
4. Post-Markman Voices on the Determinationof "Equivalents"
Three post-Markman decisions do cite the proposition that
the determination of "equivalents" under § 112, 6 is a question of
fact.'
The precedential value of these opinions is suspect. The
most recent of these opinions, C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.,
cites to two pre-Markman decisions supporting the proposition
that the determination of "equivalents" is a factual question.' In
stating the proposition that determination of "equivalents" is a
factual question, MAS-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., cites one
pre-Markman and one post-Markman case as authority. As
previously discussed, the value of pre-Markman authority
concerning this issue is dubious.'55 Moreover, MAS Hamilton's
post-Markman citation

56

to

a

concurrence

in

Cybor 57

is

construing patent claims).
150. Id. (noting that the "standard of review remains intact").
151. Id. at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring) (noting that where the district court
has put forth the effort some weight would be afforded to the judge's
determination although there would be no new formal standard of review); Id.

at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring) (noting his intent not to disregard the work of
the district court in claim construction); Id. at 1463-64 (Mayer, C.J.,
concurring) (noting that if claim construction was purely a question of law the
Supreme Court would not have undertaken such a thorough Seventh

Amendment analysis and that the Supreme Court did not adopt the Federal
Circuit's reasoning in Markman); Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1473-74 (Rader, J.,

concurring) (pointing out that the Supreme Court nowhere discussed the
standard of appellate court review in Markman); Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1478-79

(Newman, J., concurring) (discussing the unbalancing effect of the holding on
appellate review).
152. Gary M. Hoffman & Herbert V. Kerner, The Federal Circuit's Majority
Set A Strict De Novo Standard, But Vocal Minority May Win Yet, NAT'L L.J.,
June 22, 1998, at C19; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1362

(Fed. Cir. 1998).
153. MAS-Hamilton Group v. LaGard Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (citing
authority for the proposition that the final two-step determination of

equivalence under § 112, 6 is a question of fact); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys.,
Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Burke, 82 F.3d 435 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (unpublished table disposition).
154. C.R. Bard,Inc., 157 F.3d at 1362.

155. 156 F.3d at 1211.
156. See supra part II.B.i (analyzing pre-Markmanjudicial precedent).

157. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1466 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring).
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disingenuous, as the majority opinion in Cybor specifically
reserved judgement on the issue of who should decide
"equivalents."158
In re Burke,"' the other post-Markman decision stating the
proposition that the fact finder should determine § 112,
6
"equivalents," has absolutely no precedential value because it is an
unpublished disposition. 6 ° All of these opinions also omit any
reference to the controversy surrounding the determination of
"equivalents" raised by the Federal Circuit in Markman.
Therefore, none of the post-Markman opinions that support the
proposition that finders of fact should determine "equivalents"
command much authority. 1 1
5. Other Precedent
Three lines of precedent distinct from either the doctrine of
equivalents or § 112,
6 support the proposition that the
determination of "equivalents" be relegated to the jury. Under the
first of these lines of precedent, the Federal Circuit has made it
clear that the district court cannot interpret claim language in
light of an accused device.'62 However, comparing the identified
structure against the accused device is exactly how equivalence is
determined."3 Secondly, as this comparison to determine
equivalence is also the last step in the infringement analysis,
judicial determination of "equivalents" would completely remove
the jury's role from the infringement picture. Clearly this would
run afoul of the right to a determination of infringement
by a jury,
64
which is protected under the Seventh Amendment.
Another line of cases, emphasized since the Markman finding
that a patent is a fully integrated instrument,'6' have strongly

158. Id. at 1457 n.5. .[Wie need not consider whether equivalence under §
112, 6 is a question of law or fact." Id.

159. 82 F.3d at 435 (unpublished table disposition).
160. Federal Circuit Local Rule 47.6(b) (stating that cases not intended to be
used as precedent are not to be cited or used as precedent).
161. It is interesting to note that two Federal Circuit panels, and five
separate judges (Archer, Michel, Rader, Plager, Gajarsa, Mayer & Schell),

subscribe to the notion that the determination of "equivalents" under § 112,
6 is a question of fact. See MAS-Hamilton Group v. LaGard Inc., 156 F.3d
1206, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Burke, 82 F.3d at 435 (unpublished table

disposition).
162. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (pointing out
that claims are clearly not interpreted to cover or not cover an accused
infringing device).

163. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing the
infringement analysis of "means-plus-function" claims).
164. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 370 (1996)
(noting that there is no dispute that infringement is a question for the jury

due to long-standing historical precedent).
165. 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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cautioned against the use of extrinsic evidence" in claim
interpretation.'67 Because the accused device is by its very nature
extrinsic, 6 8 the district court should not properly be able to
consider the accused device in interpreting the patent claims.'69
This limitation effectively prevents a judge from undertaking the
§ 112, 6 analysis which ultimately determines
last step of the
"equivalents." 70 By preventing the judge from undertaking the
6 analysis, these lines of precedent
final step in the § 112,
construct a significant barrier to judicial determination of
"equivalents."
6. Putting It All Together
In sum, judicial precedent, when viewed as a whole, clearly
indicates that the determination of § 112, 6 "equivalents" is more
properly a function for the jury.
C. Relative InterpretiveSkills of Judges Versus Juries
Another major factor that shifted claim construction to the
judicial province was the judges' perceived superiority in
interpreting patent claims.' 7' The question becomes whether, "as a
matter of the sound administration of justice," a judge or jury is
better suited to determine "equivalents" under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6.172

In the similarly situated issue of claim construction, both the

166. Intrinsic evidence consists of the patent claims, specification, and the
prosecution history of the patent. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman
Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Extrinsic evidence
includes: technical journals, treatises, dictionaries, and expert testimony.
Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
167. See Personalized Media Comm., LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d
696, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (disallowing any extrinsic evidence where the claim
in question is clear); Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys.,
132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); cf. Key Pharm. v. Hercon Lab. Corp., 161
F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (disclaiming any absolute bar on extrinsic
evidence); Mantech Envtl. Corp. v. Hudson Envtl. Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (allowing extrinsic evidence to understand the
technology involved in the patent but disproving of extrinsic evidence if it
contradicts the claim language).
168. Casey, supra note 12, at 853 (noting that an "equivalent" under § 112,
6, is, by its very nature, extrinsic evidence).
169. See supra note 161.
170. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
171. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
"The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges
often do and are likely to do better than jurors .... ." Markman, 517 U.S. at
388 (emphasis added).
172. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added).
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Federal Circuit 17' and the Supreme Court... came down on the side
of the judge. Their reasoning was clear: due to the inherent
difficulty of patent construction, judges are better trained and
disciplined to properly construe the scope of a patent claim.'75
However, the latest numbers from the Federal Circuit show that
approximately forty percent of the claim constructions reviewed by
the Federal Circuit have been reversed and remanded to the
district court.176 Observers attribute this high rate of error both to
district court judges' unfamiliarity with complex technical issues
and their apparent unwillingness to properly construe patent
claims. 177 These factors cast a shadow of doubt as to whether a
judge is inherently more capable of claim construction than a jury.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted the "fundamental
principle of American law that 'the construction of a written
evidence is exclusively with the court.", 78

Unfortunately, this

principle is of little help in the determination of equivalence
between the patent claim and the accused device under § 112, T 6.
Because a patent is a fully integrated instrument,179 no dispute
exists that the judge must: 1) determine whether a limitation is
drafted in means-plus-function format; 2) ascertain the function
which the limitation performs; and 3) identify the corresponding

173. Markman, 52 F.3d at 977.
174. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388. "So it turns out here, for judges, not juries
are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms." Id.
175. Id. at 388-89. It is important to note that this was an assumption of the
Court that has not been born out in practice. Id.
176. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., concurring) (noting that 47 of 126 or 37.3% of
Federal Circuit decisions reviewing the issue of claim construction were
reversed between the date Markman was decided (April 5, 1995) and
November 24, 1997).
177. See Fisk, supra note 11, at A20 (noting that some district court judges
construe patent claims narrowly to make summary judgment proper,
effectively dumping the problem of claim construction on the Federal Circuit
through appellate review); see also Philip J. McCabe & P. McCoy Smith,
Courts Order 'Markman' Hearings Early In Cases Such Hearings Often
PrecipitateA Party's Request For Summary Judgment or a Settlement Order,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 19, 1998, at C42 (citing that judges are pushing claim
construction to an earlier time in the case to achieve quicker disposition).
178. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978, partially quoting Chief Justice Marshall in
Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186, 2L.Ed. 404 (1805); accord Eddy v.
Prudence Bonds Corp., 165 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned Hand, J.)
("[Aippellate courts have untrammelled power to interpret written
documents...."); 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 601, at

303 (3d ed. 1961) ("Upon countless occasions, the courts have declared it to be
the responsibility of the judge to interpret and construe written instruments,
whatever their nature.")
179. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (noting that the patentability requirements of
the statutes provide a description of the invention must be disclosed such that
one of ordinary skill in the art can make and use the invention).
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structure performing the function.'
Accordingly, a judge's
superior interpretive skills do not come into play in an equivalence
determination because the accused device, as opposed to a written
instrument, is compared against the means-plus-function
limitation. 8' Thus, the Federal Circuit's belief that judges are
better situated to interpret written instruments does not indicate
that judges should determine § 112, 6 "equivalents." Therefore,
no superior weight can be afforded to the judicial determination of
"equivalents" in a means-plus-function claim.
D. Statutory Policies ConcerningDeterminationof "Equivalents"
Two legislative policies must be taken into account in the
ultimate answer in deciding whether a judge or jury determines
"equivalents."82 First, the intent of Congress in passing the
current § 112,
6 must be examined.'83 Second, Congress' desire
to promote uniform application of the patent laws through the
creation of the Federal Circuit must also be considered.'
On its face, the recitation in § 112, 6 that "such claim shall
be construed to cover the corresponding structure... and
equivalents thereof' places the determination of "equivalents"
under the purely legal issue of claim construction. 8' However, the
Supreme Court has insisted that statutory language is not to be
interpreted in isolation. 88 Unfortunately, the legislative history of
§ 112,
6 provides virtually no guidance.'
Congress' use of
"construed" should also be viewed with suspicion as interpreting
"equivalents" under claim construction because, at the time the
original language was drafted, claim construction was not
accorded the same emphasis and scrutiny as today.'88 Accordingly,

180. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1457 n.5 (reserving the issue of whether a judge
or jury decides "equivalents"); see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 977 n.8 (reserving

only the issue of who determines "equivalents").
181. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing the elements
of an infringement analysis under § 112, 91
6).
182. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)

(discussing Congress' creation of the Federal Circuit in large part to promote
uniformity in application of patent laws).
183. See id.

184.
185.
law).
186.
U.S.

Id.
See id. at 390 (allocating all aspects of claim construction as a matter of
United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484
365, 371, (1988) (noting that statutory interpretation is a "holistic

endeavor").

187. See Reviser's Notes, 35 U.S.C. § 112, H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 19 (1952) (stating only "[a] new J1relating to functional claims is
added.. ."); see also Pub. L. No. 89-93, § 9, 79 Stat. 261 (1965) (recodifying
section without any commentary); Pub. L. No. 94-431, § 7, 89 Stat. 690-91
(1975) (recodifying section without any commentary).
18& See Markman 52 F.3d at 977 (holding occurring only in 1995).
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6 is
the analysis of Congressional intent surrounding § 112,
inconclusive." 9
Another important policy to be considered is the
Congressional emphasis on the uniform application of the patent
statutes. 9 ° Indeed, this want of uniformity was one of the major
motivating factors in the creation of the Federal Circuit. 9' The
Supreme Court further emphasized this goal in Markman. 9' One
of the Court's main reasons for holding that claim construction is a
matter of law was to promote the consistent interpretation of the
scope of patent coverage. 9 ' Thus, courts should carefully consider
Congress' policy of uniformity in applying patent statute and
doctrines."
6 infringement analysis reveals that
Reviewing the § 112,
the uniform application of that statute is commensurately
Every step until the final determination that an
protected.
accused device is "equivalent" is a matter of law reserved for the
court."' The final determination of whether an accused device is
"equivalent" under § 112, T 6 is unequivocally different in every
case.' 6 Thus, no single court could properly set forth, or enforce,
the entire scope of "equivalents" of a means-plus-function
Hence, leaving only the actual question of
limitation. 97
infringement to the jury in no way impairs the uniform application
of patent law.
Therefore, allowing a jury to determine "equivalents" under §
112, 6 violates neither Congressional intent in enacting § 112,
6 nor the uniform application of the patent statutes.

III. "EQUIVALENCE" SHOULD BE A QUESTION OF FACT TEMPERED BY
RULE 49-SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES

Congress and the Federal Judiciary have both recognized the
need for uniformity in application of the patent laws. 9 ' A major

189. See Casey, supra note 12, at 847 (noting that the legislative history is
limited in scope and applicability).
190. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (citing to H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-23
(1981)).
191. Id. at 390 (noting Congress' purpose in creating the Federal Circuit was

to promote uniformity in patent law).
192. Id. at 390-91.
193. Id. (noting that this purpose would be "ill served" should claim
construction vary dependent upon different juries).

194. Id.
195. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text (discussing analysis of
infringement claims under § 112, 916).
196. Casey, supra note 12, at 852.
197. See Sutton et al., supra note 11, at 888 (noting no court will likely make
a "laundry list" of "equivalents")
198. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of
Congress in creating the Federal Circuit).
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consideration that has arisen in the uniform application of patent
laws is the amount of power that juries wield in determining
patent issues.'99 In the Markman cases, the pendulum swung in
favor of judicial power."0 ' The Federal Circuit's decision in Hilton
Davis swung the pendulum back in favor of the jury. Lying
between these two shifts is the subtle, yet important, question of
where the pendulum will ultimately come to rest in the
determination of "equivalents" under § 112, %6.
Examining the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Markman
in balancing questions of law versus questions of fact, this
Comment proposes that the Federal Circuit adopt the position that
the determination of § 112,
6 "equivalents" is a factual
determination. In order to provide a more workable standard for
the courts, and in light of the highly complex nature of patent
cases, this Comment also proposes that the courts adopt the
procedures codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49201 (Rule
49) when determining 112, 6 "equivalents."
Rule 49 special verdicts and interrogatories have already
found widespread district court use 212 and approval in Federal
Circuit patent litigation.0 2
The Supreme Court has similarly
endorsed the use of Rule 49 in patent litigation.2 °
Thus the
199. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing the significance
of whether the determination of a particular issue is a question of law or of
fact in recent cases before the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court).
200. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 370 (1996);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
201. Rule 49(a) provides for the submission of separate special verdicts as
written findings on each factual question capable of a categorical answer.
FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a). Rule 49(b) provides for the submission of interrogatories
concerning factual questions underlying a general verdict. Id. at 49(b). Rule
49(b) has also been described as a middle ground between the general verdict
and special verdict under Rule 49(a). Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc.,
839 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Confusion exists as to the real
differences between the two formats. Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp.,
972 F.2d 1300, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the general and special
verdicts will be discussed as a single concept.
202. See, e.g., Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing Rule 49(a) special interrogatories in
enforceability and infringement); Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557,
1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting use of special verdicts for validity and
obviousness); Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 586 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (setting out district court's Rule 49(a) special verdict questions for
patentability requirements).
203. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting)
(noting approval of special interrogatories on issue of validity and factual
questions underlying obviousness); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park
Rubber Comp., 749 F.2d 707, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting the focus which Rule
49 gives to an issue).
204. Werner-Jenkins Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39
(1997) (noting Rule 49 could be a helpful device to simplify litigation in patent
cases).
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extension of Rule 49 practice into the determination of § 112, 6
"equivalents" seems a natural development.
The greatest impact of the determination of "equivalents" as a
factual question will fall on appellate review of the fact finder's
determination." 5 As a factual question, the Federal Circuit must
review the determination of "equivalents" for clear error. °6 This
necessitates that the Federal Circuit give substantial deference to
the trier of fact's determinations.2 7 Such a deferential standard of
review has raised the concern that judgements will be virtually
unassailable."'
However, Rule 49 practice will effectively dispel this
concern.20 9
Skillfully crafted Rule 49 special verdicts and
interrogatories can help simplify the judge's role and guide the
jury in their consideration of the evidence.2 1 This direction will
also help to protect the jury's role in patent infringement verdicts
upon appellate review."'
Use of Rule 49 special verdicts and interrogatories will
further promote review by exposing a jury's verdict to more
thorough consideration.212 This thorough examination will also
increase judicial economy by preserving correctly decided aspects
of a case and reversing only erroneous findings.212
The Federal Circuit, in encouraging the use of Rule 49, should
be careful not to overstep their authority. The Federal Circuit
may not mandate the use of special verdicts and interrogatories as
it is left to the discretion of the trial court how a verdict is
rendered. 214 Because a district court exerts substantial influence

205. See Casey, supra note 12, at 858 (discussing appellate review).
206. Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Marubeni
America Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
207. See Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1415
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting deferential standard of review under clear error).
208. See Hilton Davis, 520 U.S. at 37-38 (discussing unreviewability of
"black-box" verdicts); The Jury's Capacity To Decide Complex Civil Cases, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1492 (1997) (noting critics concern over general verdicts).
209. See Richardson-Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1485 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (noting that Rule 49(a) special verdicts allow for more complete review

of verdicts).
210. Id. "The special verdict compels detailed consideration." Id.
211. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(Michel, J., dissenting).
212. See Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1485; Mainland Indus., Inc. v.
Standal's Patents Ltd., 799 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting the verdict

was not "naked"); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725
F.2d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that Rule 49 helps appellate and

district court review).
213. Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1551 (Fed. Cir.

1989)
214. Newell Co. v. Kenney Mfg., 864 F.2d 757, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
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over a trial through the use of Rule 49,15 the court must act
prudently to avoid prejudicial emphasis resulting from Rule 49
misuse. 16 Moreover, the courts should not use Rule 49 as an
excuse to subject a verdict to a higher level of scrutiny.217
Thus, use of Rule 49 in patent infringement suits will help
the jury reach better verdicts, protect their proper role in patent
suits, and facilitate review of patent verdicts. This, in turn, will
promote Congress' goal of promoting the consistent application of
patent laws.218
CONCLUSION

Recent decisions of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court have placed interpretation of § 112,
6 "equivalents" in a
state of turmoil.
The Federal Circuit should recognize the
imbalance that this ambiguity has caused and stop dodging the
question of its interpretation. Although there is no clear Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial on the issue of "equivalents,"
prevailing precedent indicates the determination of "equivalents"
is a question for the trier of fact. Neither judicial interpretation
nor statutory policy mitigate against this conclusion. Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit should fulfill its statutory purpose and
establish a clear precedent holding that determination of
"equivalents" is a proper role for the jury. To further promote
consistency and facilitate review of patent judgements, the Federal
Circuit should establish a policy encouraging the use of Rule 49
special
verdicts
and
interrogatories
for
infringement
determinations of claims invoking § 112, 6.

215. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Co., 775 F.2d 1107, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
216. Newell, 864 F.2d at 772-73.
217. See id. at 774 (warning against reversing jury verdict upon subsequent
findings by the court); id. at 782 (noting "Rule 49 is not a vehicle for defeating

a constitutionally protected right to jury trial").
218. Structural Rubber Prod. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 724 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).

